Dimensions of Compliance-Gaining Behavior: An Empirical Analysis
Author(s): Gerald Marwell and David R. Schmitt
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Dimensions of Compliance-Gaining Behavior: An Empirical Analysis*

GERALD MARWELL AND DAVID R. SCHMITT

University of Wisconsin

A large sample of college students completed questionnaires indicating the likelihood of their performing 16 types of compliance-gaining techniques in each of four hypothetical situations. Five major clusters of techniques were distinguished through a principal factor analysis with oblique rotations: (I) rewarding activity; (II) punishing activity; (III) expertise; (IV) activation of impersonal commitments; (V) activation of personal commitments. Two second order factors were derived: The first, defined by Factors I, III and IV, included the more socially acceptable techniques; the second, defined by Factors II and V, reflected unacceptable techniques. Results support the conceptualization of compliance-gaining techniques by general dimensions based on use. A general correspondence between the factors and French and Raven's "bases of social power" suggests that classes of techniques may be separated by respondents in terms of the type of interpersonal power which is most relevant.

Many social psychologists assume, perhaps heuristically, that all behavior is goal-directed, and that all actions are attempts to restructure the environment to satisfy some desire. As a corollary social behavior becomes the manipulation of other people to achieve the goals of the actor, and the study of interaction becomes the study of social control.

Even without such an inclusive perspective, it is clear that people spend a good deal of time trying to get others to act in ways they desire. It is equally clear that people vary in the ways they go about attempting such interpersonal control. Yet, students of social control have only recently begun to explore these variations. Most research has concentrated on why people comply rather than on how they go about gaining compliance. The extensive research with variables such as conformity and persuasibility is generally of this former type.

What research findings there are on the selection of behaviors tend to concentrate on selected techniques in various situations. Jones and his as-

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sociates 1 have studied "ingratiation" and several conditions surrounding its use. Christie and his associates 2 have identified "Machiavellian" manipulative techniques and who tends to use them. Schmitt 3 has examined the use of moral obligation. Schneider 4 has analyzed the content of persuasive communications to determine means used to obtain compliance.

None of this research, however, has systematically explored the range of compliance-gaining behaviors or elaborated the factors involved in their enactment. Such elaboration seems to us to depend, first of all, on the reduction of the multitude of possible behaviors into meaningful clusters or what might be called strategies. In most non-experimental situations the number of behaviors which might be enacted is enormous. Prediction of a specific behavior becomes a task for a science of immense power. More modestly, we might aspire to predict the differential use of behaviors from among meaningful groupings.

The establishment of these groupings is therefore the major task pursued in this paper. Our approach shall be to seek out clusters of compliance-gaining techniques which empirically co-vary through actors in terms of their perceived probability of enactment. Thus, a strategy is here defined as a group of techniques towards which potential actors tend to respond similarly. Persons who see themselves as likely to perform one of the techniques from a cluster will tend to see themselves as likely to perform the others. Conversely, tendencies to use techniques within one cluster will not predict well responses to techniques in other clusters. Thus, strategies are distinguished from one another by the fact that they elicit some substantial and reliable differential response. By examining the items contained in each cluster we may develop some further understanding of the dimensions which differentiate among techniques in ways which are important to at least the population of actors being studied.

**ANALYTICAL TREATMENTS: RELEVANT LITERATURE**

Although research on the problem of the dimensions of compliance-gaining behavior is scarce several important theoretical treatments have been formulated. These treatments vary in the degree to which a systematic exhaustion

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of the types of techniques is attempted and the rationales behind the selection of categories. For example, Thibaut and Kelley are primarily concerned with techniques for "augmenting" outcomes for the actor in interpersonal situations; Etzioni with types of power in organizational contexts and Parsons with modes through which influence can occur. Whatever their principal concerns, these analyses provide a list of potential techniques for consideration here. They may also be viewed as providing sets of alternative hypotheses for our findings. Thus, if our results correspond closely with any of the theoretical statements we shall be able to point to a potentially important convergence which may provide an analytical explanation of the findings. It should be noted, however, that non-convergence with a set of theoretical dimensions does not provide negative evidence as to the usefulness of that set for the purposes and questions to which it was initially addressed.

FIGURE 1

Parsons' Paradigm of "Ways of Getting Results in Interaction"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Channel</th>
<th>Intentional</th>
<th>Situational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sanction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>Persuasion</td>
<td>Inducement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>Money</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>Activation of commitments</td>
<td>Deterrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Generalization of commitments</td>
<td>Power</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The clearest set of applicable dimensions may be derived from Parsons' discussion of "ways of getting results in interaction." Parsons posits four basic "modes" derived from a paradigm bordered by two dichotomies. The paradigm, including examples of what Parsons calls the "medium" through which each mode is controlled, is contained in Figure 1.

While the dichotomy between positive and negative sanctions is apparent, the distinction between situational and intentional "channels" is less so. It is based upon the difference between the actor's restructuring the situation within which the target responds, and some attempt to work directly upon the target's intentions or motives. As an example of the latter type of action, Parsons notes the technique of convincing the target that compliance would actually be to his advantage. Thus, the distinction may be viewed as one

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6 Ibid., p. 44.
between changing the target’s definition of the situation and changing the situation itself.

A second set of strategies is suggested by French and Raven in their discussion of the “bases of social power.” Presumably, if there are five underlying bases of social power, we might cluster techniques of control by the basis of power which they tap. Therefore, although the list is not as systematically derived as Parsons’, it may still provide hypotheses for empirical test.

The first two bases of power described by French and Raven, “reward” power and “coercive” power, are similar to Parsons’ modes of “inducement” and “deterrence.” They involve activation of the target’s perception that the actor has the ability to mediate salient rewards and punishments. French and Raven’s “expert” power, involving the activation of the target’s perception that the actor has some special knowledge, parallels Parsons’ “persuasion.” On the other hand, both “legitimate” power, based on the target’s perception that the actor has a right to prescribe behavior, and “referent” power, based on the target’s identification with the actor, seem special cases of Parsons’ “activation of commitments.” Thus, legitimate and referent power may differ as to whether interpersonal commitments or commitments to the legitimate norms of some collectivity are activated. Whether this distinction is meaningful in terms of the clustering of use responses remains an empirical question.

Two shorter lists of strategies are described by Etzioni and Kelman. Unlike the typologies above neither separates positively from negatively oriented behaviors. Etzioni distinguishes his three basic types of power for gaining compliance by the means employed. Thus, “coercive” power involves physical means such as force or pain. Parsons considers this the limiting case of deterrence. “Remunerative” power involves material means, as represented generally by money, and may be used either negatively, through fines, the destruction of property, etc., or positively. “Normative” power rests on the allocation and manipulation of symbolic rewards and deprivations, such as esteem, and disapproval. Etzioni later distinguishes two types of normative power. The first, “pure” normative power, involves the manipulation of esteem, prestige and ritualistic symbols. The second, “social” power, rests on the use of acceptance, positive response, and other typically “informal”

methods. Etzioni emphasizes, however, that both types of normative power use essentially the same means of control.

In Kelman's analysis all techniques by which the actor controls the outcomes for the target, including "inducement" and "deterrence," are called "compliance" techniques. His second strategy, "identification," is similar to French and Raven's referent power, but is intended to also include techniques by which the actor activates the target's commitment to some given role he feels he should play. Finally, "internalization" is defined in much the same way as French and Raven's expert power.

In perhaps the most inclusive list of types of techniques, Skinner \(^\text{10}\) adds several possibilities. "Reinforcement" and "punishment" are similar to inducement and deterrence. As with Etzioni, "physical force," is a separate category. Perhaps closest to Parsons' "persuasion" is Skinner's "pointing up contingencies." "Aversive stimulation" is introduced by Skinner as a separate technique. Here negative reinforcement is employed previous to the opportunity for the target to comply, with the stipulation that the aversive stimulus will be removed when compliance is forthcoming. The key factor differentiating this technique from punishment is the time sequence. Through the additional techniques of "deprivation" and "satiation" the target is motivated either more or less strongly toward a given goal so that he becomes more or less likely to perform actions which might achieve that goal. "Emotion" also involves the manipulation of the target previous to his being asked to comply. In a process similar, if not identical, with Parsons' "activation of commitments," the actor tries to establish "emotional predispositions" toward himself or the desired action which are favorable, so that the target will be more likely to comply. A more direct manipulation of emotional state, and a separate technique in Skinner's list, is the use of drugs, such as alcohol. Finally, under the heading of "manipulating stimuli" Skinner groups a broad range of behaviors including such actions as introducing "supplemental stimuli" by interpreting a situation favorably (persuasion again?), and eliminating a behavior by invoking incompatible responses (activation of commitments?).

Although Thibaut and Kelley \(^\text{11}\) also describe inducement, which they call the "augmentation" of outcomes for the target, and deterrence, called "reduction" of outcomes, their key additions to the material discussed thus far are also distinguished by their location in the temporal sequence of actions. Thus, they suggest that the actor might reduce the number of alternative responses the target may make before the actual compliance-gaining attempt. The use


\(^\text{11}\) John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelley, \textit{The Social Psychology of Groups}, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959, p. 120.
of physical force (handcuffs, etc.), as described by Skinner, would probably fall into this category. Other techniques raised include reducing the target’s skills, which seems a special case of reducing his alternatives, and devaluing the target’s “product.” The latter technique, for example, may have the actor feign disinterest in the target’s compliance. The examples of uses of this technique are common, but inclusion in a list of techniques is unique to Thibaut and Kelley and, perhaps, Stephen Potter. Of somewhat greater interest is the technique of improving the actor’s ability to reward the target. Included in this technique are ingratiating behaviors which parallel techniques using referent power, but occur earlier in the temporal sequence. As noted above, this technique has been discussed at length by Jones. In turn, ingratiating, together with several other techniques by which the actor might increase his ability to reward or persuade the target, may be included under Goffman’s general notion of “impression management.” Here, the actor tries to increase his own attractiveness to the target or, by building up his own expertise, to increase the persuasiveness of his arguments.

Finally, Weinstein and Deutchberger have described a particularly interesting technique of interpersonal manipulation which they call “altercasting.” The actor attempts to make the target define himself as playing a given role by treating him as if he expected him to play that role. Thus, a teacher may ask a bright student whom he fears will not go to college what college he is planning to attend, thereby encouraging him to actually go. This may be a special case of activation of commitments, but is somewhat different from any technique noted above.

PROCEDURES

To distinguish a set of dimensions of compliance-gaining behavior we constructed a questionnaire designed to elicit the respondents’ likelihood of performing various types of techniques in different situations. After several pretests a rating form was devised which described four situations in which the respondent was to imagine himself as the actor trying to gain the compliance of another. For each situation sixteen possible behaviors for enactment were presented, each representing a given technique. The respondent was asked to indicate how likely he was to use each technique on a six point

13 Jones, op. cit.
scale ranging from “Definitely would use” to “Definitely would not use.”

The four situations were selected primarily because of the variety of plausible techniques that could be used in them. There is no question but that they represent no systematic sample of compliance-gaining situations, and we can make no additional argument for their selection. The parameters of the “population” of such situations is beyond our current knowledge and thus the present sample must be considered as a kind of “case study.” However, an attempt was made to include situations in terms of three criteria. Most importantly, we decided to concentrate on short-run compliance attempts. Longer-run compliance is, of course, quite as important in our lives, but presentation of relevant actions becomes somewhat unworkable as the actions themselves become long-run, complex and/or repetitive. In addition, Blau suggests that the phenomena of short-term and long-term compliance place premiums on different kinds of techniques. For example, the use of moral obligations for long-run compliance might tend to weaken the ability of the actor to use obligations again to reinforce his attempt at a later time. The authority structure of the actor-target relationships was varied as such structure might seriously affect the types of techniques attempted. Finally, we wanted situations with which our prospective student sample might be supposed to have some empathy or which they might conceive of themselves as facing. The four situations used were described as follows:

**Situation A (Job):** You have worked for a large exclusive clothing store for several years as a salesman (woman). You have the best sales record in the store. You want Mr. Wilson, the owner of the store, to promote you to the position of sales manager which is now open.

**Situation B (Family):** Your teen-age son, Dick, who is a high school student, has been getting poor grades. You want him to increase the amount of time he spends studying from 6 to 12 hours a week.

**Situation C (Sales):** You are a door-to-door salesman, attempting to sell a set of encyclopedias costing $150 to Fred, the father of two school-age children.

**Situation D (Roommate):** You are failing a course in French. You would like your roommate, Pat, who has been doing very well in the course, to spend several hours tutoring you before the final examination, although Pat is very busy studying for exams.

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\(^{16}\) A rating scale was used in preference to a ranking technique since we found during the pretests that many respondents felt that they would use more than one technique in a given situation, while others felt that none of the preferred possibilities described what they would actually do.

The sixteen techniques analyzed are presented and explained in Table 1.

### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technique</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Promise</td>
<td>(If you comply, I will reward you) “You offer to increase Dick’s allowance if he increases his studying.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Threat</td>
<td>(If you do not comply I will punish you) “You threaten to forbid Dick the use of the car if he does not increase his studying.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Expertise (Positive)</td>
<td>(If you comply you will be rewarded because of “the nature of things”) “You point out to Dick that if he gets good grades he will be able to get into a good college and get a good job.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Expertise (Negative)</td>
<td>(If you do not comply you will be punished because of “the nature of things”) “You point out to Dick that if he does not get good grades he will not be able to get into a good college or get a good job.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Liking</td>
<td>(Actor is friendly and helpful to get target in “good frame of mind” so that he will comply with request) “You try to be as friendly and pleasant as possible to get Dick in the ‘right frame of mind’ before asking him to study.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Pre-Giving</td>
<td>(Actor rewards target before requesting compliance) “You raise Dick’s allowance and tell him you now expect him to study.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Aversive Stimulation</td>
<td>(Actor continuously punishes target making cessation contingent on compliance) “You forbid Dick the use of the car and tell him he will not be allowed to drive until he studies more.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Debt</td>
<td>(You owe me compliance because of past favors) “You point out that you have sacrificed and saved to pay for Dick’s education and that he owes it to you to get good enough grades to get into a good college.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Moral Appeal</td>
<td>(You are immoral if you do not comply) “You tell Dick that it is morally wrong for anyone not to get as good grades as he can and that he should study more.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Self-Feeling (Positive)</td>
<td>(You will feel better about yourself if you comply) “You tell Dick he will feel proud if he gets himself to study more.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Self-Feeling (Negative)</td>
<td>(You will feel worse about yourself if you do not comply) “You tell Dick he will feel ashamed of himself if he gets bad grades.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Altercasting (Positive)</td>
<td>(A person with “good” qualities would comply) “You tell Dick that since he is a mature and intelligent boy he naturally will want to study more and get good grades.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 1—Cont.

13. Altercasting (Negative)
   (Only a person with “bad” qualities would not comply)
   “You tell Dick that only someone very childish does not study as he
   should.”

14. Altruism
   (I need your compliance very badly, so do it for me)
   “You tell Dick that you really want very badly for him to get into
   a good college and that you wish he would study more as a personal
   favor to you.”

15. Esteem
    (Positive)
    (People you value will think better of you if you comply)
    “You tell Dick that the whole family will be very proud of him if
    he gets good grades.”

16. Esteem
    (Negative)
    (People you value will think worse of you if you do not comply)
    “You tell Dick that the whole family will be very disappointed (in
    him) if he gets poor grades.”

Each situation was followed by short descriptions of the techniques as they
might be used in that setting. As examples the specific behaviors representing
the techniques in Situation B are also given in the table.

The list of techniques in Table 1 does not represent a complete summation
of all the possible techniques noted in the literature. Pretest results indicated
that many subtle pre-request techniques, including various types of impres-
sion management, are difficult to represent or even describe, especially in
situations where the actor and target have a relationship of long standing.
Situations in which both physical force and a broad range of other tech-
niques are viable alternatives are difficult to present, as our pretests indicated.
Thus, although the range of techniques is broad, it is not unrestricted in
scope. On the other hand, several techniques not specifically mentioned
in the literature are included in the list. For example, “expertise,” considered
by Parsons as an essentially positive technique, is here visualized as having
two potential presentation emphases. One may either emphasize the rewards
forthcoming with compliance, or the punishments attendant upon non-
compliance.

The use of responses to written questionnaires to indicate what behaviors
individuals might enact in hypothetical situations is subject to many in-
herent limitations. As has been indicated in various attitudinal studies, what
persons say they will do need not correspond to what they will do. Whether
or not our verbal responses suffer from this problem to a debilitating extent
is a question which needs to eventually be empirically tested. On the other
hand, observation of actual behavior as a procedure for distinguishing group-
ings of responses may at this point be prohibitively difficult methodologically.
If, for example, most persons respond with one technique to a given situation,
we cannot know what techniques they view as second or third choices and

18 Copies of these descriptions can be obtained from the authors.
which they view as “impossibilities.” Yet, it is this latter data which we must have to establish similarities in response across techniques. Thus, we have used verbal responses for this preliminary analysis hoping that for the population as a whole patterns of co-variation among verbal responses and patterns of co-variation among actual response tendencies will not be very much different.

Respondents consisted of 608 students in introductory sociology courses at the University of Wisconsin. Approximately 70 per cent were female. Slightly over two-thirds were freshmen, 17 per cent were sophomores, and 12 per cent were juniors or seniors. Since our focus was on the identification of general dimensions rather than the description of the distribution of behaviors in the population or the prediction of specific dependent variables, we believed that the characteristics of the sample would not be prohibitively restrictive, and would allow a useful preliminary description of the relationships among the variables. Nevertheless, other populations may produce results at variance with those reported below. Children, for example, may not see distinctions which are important for college students, and vice versa. Thus, if the results of this analysis appear promising the extension of the research to other populations becomes an imperative next step.

RESULTS

For the primary analysis the responses of individuals to each technique were summed across the four situations. By using summary scores, rather than responses within each situation, we hoped to better represent the overall tendencies of individuals to use a given technique and the relationships among tendencies to use various techniques. Within each situation any given technique may be poorly or well represented by our example and thus provide a more or less accurate description of the respondent's tendency to use the technique. Relationships become more prone to reduction in size through this error component. Scores accumulated through successive taps upon the same response tendency should have greater reliability.

To determine the empirical groupings of techniques, the summary scores were factor analyzed using a principal factor solution. Seven factors were extracted. After the seventh factor no additional factor with as much variance as any single item could be identified. Neither of the last two factors contained any items loaded above .2 and were considered unimportant. The first five factors were rotated to oblique simple structure using a varimax criterion. Oblique rotations were employed as we were primarily interested in reliably identifying those clusters of items defining the factors. The loadings of all the items on the five retained factors are presented in Table 2.19

19 The analytic procedures for the rotations are explained in detail by Chester W.
**TABLE 2**

*Factor Loadings: Oblique Rotations, Sixteen Compliance-Gaining Techniques*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technique</th>
<th>Factor I</th>
<th>Factor II</th>
<th>Factor III</th>
<th>Factor IV</th>
<th>Factor V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Promise</td>
<td>.507</td>
<td>.210</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>.566</td>
<td>.034</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expertise (positive)</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.521</td>
<td>.259</td>
<td>-.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expertise (negative)</td>
<td>.101</td>
<td>.118</td>
<td>.488</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>.195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liking</td>
<td>.563</td>
<td>-.030</td>
<td>.150</td>
<td>.142</td>
<td>-.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Giving</td>
<td>.663</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td>.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aversive Stimulation</td>
<td>.126</td>
<td>.560</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>.071</td>
<td>.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.210</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>.486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Appeal</td>
<td>-.111</td>
<td>.150</td>
<td>.103</td>
<td>.363</td>
<td>.286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Feeling (positive)</td>
<td>.121</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>.732</td>
<td>.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Feeling (negative)</td>
<td>-.031</td>
<td>.149</td>
<td>-.012</td>
<td>.556</td>
<td>.289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altercasting (positive)</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.009</td>
<td>.175</td>
<td>.599</td>
<td>-.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altercasting (negative)</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td>.209</td>
<td>-.059</td>
<td>.371</td>
<td>.343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Altruism</td>
<td>.217</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.116</td>
<td>-.018</td>
<td>.530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esteem (positive)</td>
<td>.135</td>
<td>-.066</td>
<td>.118</td>
<td>.557</td>
<td>.182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Esteem (negative)</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td>.345</td>
<td>.526</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results are relatively clear and easy to interpret. The first three factors, in particular, seem to be uniquely and definitively defined. The fourth and fifth factors are in the main relatively clear and amenable to interpretation, but present some difficulties in interpreting the associations of certain items.

The first factor is clearly defined by the only three techniques involving active manipulation of the target’s environment in a positive way: Pre-Giving, Liking and Promise. The factor is therefore titled *rewarding activity*.

Equally clear is the second factor, which is defined by the only two items involving explicit *negative* manipulation of the target’s environment: Threat and Aversive Stimulation. The factor is therefore titled *punishing activity*.

The third factor is defined exclusively by both expertise items, positive and negative, and is titled *expertise*.

The fourth factor has seven items loaded .3 or higher. These include all but two of what might be called the non-active techniques. The remaining two, Altruism and Debt, partially define factor five. The seven highly-loaded

Harris and Henry F. Kaiser, “Oblique Factor Analytic Solutions by Orthogonal Transformations,” *Psychometrika*, 29 (1964). Because the rotations are oblique there are combined as well as unique contributions to the items. The program used does not separate these elements, and communalities and amounts of variance accounted for by the factors are therefore not reported.
items on the fourth factor are positive and negative Self-Feelings, positive and negative Altercasting, positive and negative Esteem, and Moral Appeals.

In general, the techniques defining the factor may be characterized as involving what Parsons calls the "activation of commitments." However, noting the absence of Debt and Altruism, both of which should also fall within this concept, the factor is tentatively titled activation of impersonal commitments.

The fifth factor is defined by Altruism, negative Esteem, Debt, and negative Altercasting. The presence of Altruism and Debt lead to the provisional title activation of personal commitments. The question of the relations of negative Esteem and Altercasting to this factor remains. These are the only two techniques in the matrix which load above .3 on more than one factor. They may be said to be the only "complex" items in the matrix. This problem will be addressed in the following section in conjunction with an evaluation and interpretation of the results in terms of the current literature.

Before moving on to this discussion, however, some further analysis of the relationships between the techniques is possible. Since the rotations of the factors were oblique, the factors are themselves correlated. Analysis of these correlations may provide insights into more general, second-order effects by which the techniques may be grouped. Table 3 contains the correlations among the first-order factors. Table 4 contains the loadings of the factors on two
second-order factors derived from an oblique rotation (by sight) of a centroid extraction.

The first second-order factor is defined by Factors I, III and IV: rewarding activity, expertise and activation of impersonal commitments. The second factor is defined by the two remaining first-order factors: Factor II, punishing activity, and V, activation of personal commitments.

The distinction between these two groups of factors seems to be in terms of their social acceptability. Mean Use scores for the six techniques which define Factors II and V, indicate that they are six of the seven least used techniques. Thus, the first second-order factor might be named tendency to use socially acceptable techniques, and the second tendency to use socially unacceptable techniques.

It should be noted that there were substantial differences within our population on tendencies to “use” techniques at all. Some respondents rated all techniques low in certain situations while others rated five or six very highly. Such responses may arise from a “halo” or “use of the scale” problem of reliability. Assuming basic reliability, however, the notion that some people are more active and flexible than others in their compliance-gaining attempts is congruent with everyday observations. This notion of general activity and flexibility is reinforced by the fact that all five factors are positively intercorrelated and fall in the same quadrant in the second-order analysis. The correlation between the two second order factors is .59.

DISCUSSION

The data provide strong support for the conceptualization of compliance gaining techniques by general dimensions on the basis of use. Comparison of the factor structure with the several typologies presented earlier indicates that the results closely approximate the clusters suggested by French and Raven’s discussion of the bases of social power.

On their face, the dimensions of rewarding activity and punishing activity correspond well with French and Raven’s concepts of “reward” power and “coercive” power, respectively. Similarly, the expertise dimension parallels “expert” power. Somewhat less definitive is the correspondence of activation of personal commitments with “referent” power and activation of impersonal commitments with “legitimate” power.

French and Raven themselves note some difficulty with the concept of legitimate power, calling it the most complex of the bases of power they describe. Nevertheless, the basic distinction revolves around the concept of “oughtness” or internalized norms. In contrast, referent power depends on the “identification” of the target with the actor, or as French and Raven also suggest, some reference group.
We might now place the problem concerning negative Altercasting and Esteem in some perspective. If Factor IV represents *activation of internalised commitments*, i.e., as tapping "legitimate" power, and Factor V represents *activation of interpersonal commitments*, i.e., as tapping "referent" power either vis-a-vis the target or some reference group, our findings become more amenable to interpretation. We would argue that Self-Feelings and Moral Appeals are based on primarily internalized commitments, whereas Debts and appeals to Altruism are primarily interpersonal. Because the actor is always pointing out moral bases for evaluation of the target's behavior, however, there is inevitably some implication that he shares these evaluations, and some interpersonal commitments are involved.

Most importantly, the two items which simultaneously load highly on both factors are negative in phrasing. Perhaps the notion that some referent group will negatively react to the target's behavior is more important to the target's relationship to that group than is the possibility that they will react positively. For many reference groups maintenance of position does not depend on gaining approval again and again. Supposedly, even if one does not do something wonderful, one is still loved by one's parents. On the other hand, *disappointing* a reference group carries a threat to the maintenance of the relationship. Therefore, negative Esteem and Altercasting are much more salient to *interpersonal* commitments than their positive counterparts. As Homans notes in his discussion of Jennings' Hudson study, "a girl who merely conformed, without being outstanding in any other way, would not be rejected . . . (To) be positively rejected a girl must have conspicuously violated whatever norms were current." 20

It is, perhaps, this implicit threat of ostracism which accounts for the *activation of interpersonal commitments* being highly related to *punishing activity* in the second-order analysis, and its generally low desirability within the population. Within stable relationships, at least, strategies of interpersonal control which rest on threats of ostracism have potentially high costs for the actor as well as the target. Presumably the actor has some investment in the relationship and would prefer that it continue.

The convergence between French and Raven's analysis and our empirical results is one of the most encouraging aspects of the findings. Ostensibly, "what are the bases of social power" and "what are the empirical dimensions of compliance-gaining behavior" are two distinct questions. Thus, convergence in the answers leads to speculation that the respondents may separate classes of compliance-gaining techniques from one another primarily in terms of the type of interpersonal power which is most relevant. In turn,

individual compliance-gaining styles may primarily reflect the extent of each power-resource possessed by the individual and his willingness to tap that resource. Thus, many people may eschew all techniques of a given strategy either because they do not possess the requisite type of power or because they find its use distasteful, risky or costly. Analysis of individuals' power resources and attitudes towards the use of basic types of power may therefore be useful in furthering the accuracy of our predictions of their behavior.

As a final note we might emphasize again that the above results must be viewed as only a first, tentative step toward the specification of the dimensions of compliance-gaining behavior. As we have previously noted additional research incorporating additional types of compliance-gaining techniques, additional types of respondents and concrete behavior instead of verbal reports is needed before the results may be viewed as firm and established. Nevertheless, one might expect that the oblique factors found here should reappear in repeated factorizations or in analyses of extended lists of techniques. Whether additional factors emerge or some shifts in the interpretations of the factors become necessary, we at least have a starting point with which to compare future results and an empirically-grounded taxonomy which may prove useful for a variety of research purposes.